In July of 2023, a Connecticut Superior Court reviewed two motions to dismiss on personal jurisdiction grounds, granting one defendant’s motion to dismiss but denying the other. The court found personal jurisdiction existed where one defendant had an active registration to conduct business in Connecticut, but granted the other defendant’s motion to dismiss where there was no such registration. This decision, in conjunction with the Supreme Court’s June 2023 decision in Mallory v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 600 U.S. __ (2023), raises the risk that an out-of-state business with an active registration to conduct business in Connecticut may be subject to general and/or specific jurisdiction in Connecticut state courts.
By way of background, the Honorable Judge Cesar A. Noble of the Connecticut Superior Court in the Judicial District of Hartford decided Green v. United Steel Corporation, LLC. et al., No. Z07-HHD-CV-22-6158732-S (July 14, 2023), applying Connecticut’s broad long-arm statute and respective precedent:
When a foreign corporation complies with the requisites of General Statutes § 33-920 by obtaining a certificate of authority and complies with the requisites of General Statutes § 33-926 by authorizing a public official to accept service of process, it has consented to the exercise of jurisdiction over it by the courts of this state…. This consent is effective even though no other basis exists for the exercise of jurisdiction over the corporation…. Such a corporation has purposely avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within [this] [s]tate, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.
Green v. United Steel Corporation, LLC. et al., No. Z07-HHD-CV-22-6158732-S (July 14, 2023) (emphasis added) (Citing to Talenti v. Morgan & Bro. Manhattan Storage Co., 113 Conn. App. 845, 854-55, 968 A.2d 933, cert. denied, 292 Conn. 908, 973 A.2d 105 (2009)).
In Green, the plaintiffs allege that the two moving defendants were liable under Connecticut Products Liability Act, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-572m et seq., as a consequence of Mr. Green’s alleged exposure to the allegedly toxic substances in products sold by the defendants. The plaintiffs also allege a loss of consortium claim on behalf of Mr. Green’s wife. In the complaint, Mr. Green alleges that he was exposed to solvents and toxic products manufactured, marketed, supplied, sold, and/or distributed by the defendants through his employment as an automotive mechanic from 1968 to 2015. The plaintiffs further allege that this exposure to the toxic products resulted in Mr. Green developing non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma.
Two defendants moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, arguing that the court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction violates their state and federal constitutional due process rights. The defendants argued that the plaintiffs’ complaint specifically fails to establish (1) that the defendants have a regular or systematic corporate presence in Connecticut that would submit them to personal jurisdiction, or (2) that the defendants directed any of their activities to Connecticut and that Mr. Green’s alleged injuries arose out of or related to those directed activities. In response, the plaintiffs argued that Mr. Green was regularly exposed to benzene-containing products, including the defendants’ products, while working in Connecticut, and that the defendants regularly, continuously, and purposefully conduct business in Connecticut, thus establishing jurisdiction.
Judge Noble analyzed personal jurisdiction as to each defendant separately, ultimately finding that the plaintiffs failed to establish that the court had specific jurisdiction over one of the defendants, but had established the elements of specific jurisdiction over the other. Notably, Judge Noble did not cite to or reference Mallory, but the court’s holding mirrors certain aspects of the Mallory decision, albeit under a specific jurisdiction analysis. The elements factored in the court’s analysis were whether: (1) the defendant purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum, (2) the plaintiffs' claim arises out of or relates to the defendant’s forum related contacts, and (3) if the first two elements favor the plaintiffs’ choice of forum, the exercise of jurisdiction is ultimately fair and reasonable under the circumstances. Per the court in Green, if the plaintiffs cannot prove either of the first two elements, or the defendant prevails on the third element, the forum cannot exercise jurisdiction over the defendant.
Ultimately, Judge Noble differentiated the two defendants conduct for the purpose of determining specific jurisdiction on these factors, finding that one defendant purposely availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities within Connecticut but the other defendant did not. Importantly, in denying one defendant’s motion the court (1) relied on that defendant’s registration to conduct business in Connecticut and its appointed agent for service of process within the state finding that, “[s]uch registration indicates that [the defendant] targets its behavior toward the Connecticut market, and that it should reasonably foresee being haled into court in the forum.” The court next noted that (2) the plaintiffs’ claims arise out of or relate to the defendant’s forum related contacts, because the plaintiffs claimed that other products with the same alleged defects were marketed or sold in Connecticut, that the subject product was used in Connecticut, and that the injury was allegedly caused by the defective product occurred in Connecticut. Finally, the court went on to state that (3) the defendant provided no evidence or information for the court to conclude that it would be unfair for the court to exercise jurisdiction over the defendant. Therefore, in the absence of the defendant arguing that it would be unfair or unreasonable to exercise personal jurisdiction, the court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss. Because the defendant targeted the market, as evidenced by its active business registration, and its products were allegedly the source of injury to the plaintiffs, the court found it is not unreasonable to subject the defendant to suit in the forum.
By contrast, the court’s same specific jurisdiction analysis, as applied to the second defendant, found that this defendant had no reasonable expectation of doing business in the state where the corporation had not registered with the state to conduct its business. The court seemed further convinced by the fact that the defendant’s geographical range of distribution, which specifically noted that the business targets the southwest region of the United States, did not indicate any targets to Connecticut or other parts of the northeast region of the country. This factor, combined with the fact that the defendant was not registered to doing business in Connecticut, evidenced that the defendant corporation had not purposely availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities within Connecticut. As such, the court concluded that the exercise of specific jurisdiction over the defendant violates due process protections, and the motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction accordingly was granted.
The Green decision demonstrates how Connecticut state courts may view jurisdictional arguments made by corporate defendants registered to do business within the state. While the Green court assessed registration in terms of specific jurisdiction, the decision is notable in the wake of Mallory. While Green merely factored registration in its analysis, taken together with Mallory, it is possible that, moving forward, Connecticut courts will be more likely to find personal jurisdiction whether under a specific or a general jurisdiction analysis when a corporate defendant is registered to do business in Connecticut.
Gordon & Rees would like to acknowledge Summer Associate, Sheena Landy, who served as the primary author of this article.